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How are we to conceive of  modern German history? For decades historians have 
addressed this question through the ‘vanishing point’ (Helmut Walser Smith) of  
twentieth-century dictatorship, particularly the Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust. 
Explicitly or implicitly, this approach has provided the most powerful master narra-
tive in the historiography of  modern Germany. It has had both advantages and dis-
advantages. It has made a coherent narrative of  German history possible and allowed 
for the integration of  political, cultural and economic data into an overall explana-
tory framework. It has been flexible enough to give room to quite different represen-
tations.1 The flipside has been that, epistemologically, it ran contrary to historical 
understanding and hermeneutics. It has held that a latter event was able to provide 
the reason for a former event, whereas ontologically the former always explains the 
latter. The focus on the Third Reich and the Holocaust could thus be read in one 
of  two ways: either as an epistemological lens, through which certain earlier events 
became more important than others, or—particularly within emotionally charged 
debates—as a result and consequence of  modern German history, especially the long 
nineteenth century. Particularly in the Anglo-American historiographical commu-
nity, critical observations were made early on. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley 
replaced the idea of  ‘German exceptionalism’ with ‘the peculiarities of  German his-
tory’.2 German Alltagsgeschichte pointed to the ‘Eigensinn’ of  historical actors rejecting 
the attempt to subsume different realities under one coherent and cogent master 
narrative.3
William W.  Hagen, modern European historian at the University of  California, 
Davis, has now published a book on modern German history from the Reformation 
to Unification, spanning a total of  around 500 years. He does not tell one story, but 
four: the four lives of  the German nation. He distances himself  from every kind of  
‘German exceptionalism’ or long-term structural Sonderweg. He does not employ devel-
opmental models of  any sort to integrate German history from 1500 to 2000. Instead 
 1 Cf. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (6th edn, Göttingen, 1988); Helmut W. Smith, The 
Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race Across the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 
2008); Heinrich A. Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, 2 vols. (Munich, 2000–2001).
 2 Cf. Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford, 1984).
 3 Cf. Alf Lüdtke, Alltagsgeschichte: Zur Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensweisen (Frankfurt/Main, 
1995).
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he distinguishes between ‘a succession of  polycentric national existences’ (p. 17). In his 
introduction he makes clear that the book’s subtitle, ‘Four Lives of  the Nation’, does 
not point to the historical continuity of  an organic whole, ‘but rather to four quite dif-
ferent epochs in the experience of  the German-speaking peoples of  central Europe’. 
He acknowledges continuities but is much more interested in ‘ruptures so great as to 
occasion the disappearance of  social, political, and cultural identities and the death of  
worldviews and spirits of  the age’ (p. 2).
What does he mean by ‘four lives of  the nation’? First of  all he refers to the impact 
of  the political system on its citizens: the first life is the era of  the pre-nationalist 
German lands, the second that of  the long nineteenth century, the third is the interwar 
period and the fourth and final life is the postwar era since 1945. His somehow shaky 
terminology of  ‘lives of  the German nation’ refers to a relative constancy of  experi-
ences and the political environment, constituted by both commonalities and conten-
tions. Politics is the driving element in this book, which gives an overall synthesis to 
socio-political history. It is not the political system itself  that he aims to explain, but 
rather its impact on the everyday life of  Germans. Hagen does not imply four German 
nations, nor does he refer to one nation in four guises. These ‘national lives’ were not 
strictly autonomous but interacted with the lives of  their European neighbours and 
the United States. The author organizes modern German history in the form of  a 
textbook, constantly providing background information on important personalities, 
events and institutions. A vast number of  maps, tables and figures illustrate the text. 
But this is not an exercise in political iconography, since the figures do not have a lan-
guage of  their own in the book.
How does Hagen explain the internal cohesion of  these four lives, and how does 
he tackle the troublesome question of  how to pass from one life to the next? How 
do the chosen caesuras organize German history and, most importantly, is such an 
organization of  modern German history convincing? Geographically, Hagen turns to 
German-speaking central Europe, including the lands of  the Habsburg Empire. He 
analyses the political institutions of  the Holy Roman Empire and concludes that the 
Old Reich did not qualify as a modern state.4 Over time, the Old Empire proved una-
ble to develop any lasting structures of  statehood. The prevalent mentality in the first 
German life, before the French Revolution, was characterized by confessional divide, 
federalism and the tradition of  enlightened reform politics in the German states. This 
political mentality came to an end with the challenge of  the French Revolution, which 
called for a new, decidedly national response. This response came to be the common 
characteristic of  the second German life in the long nineteenth century, until the First 
World War. In this respect, Hagen includes Austria and goes beyond a kleindeutsch-, 
Prussian-centred view. The German life world of  the nineteenth century is sketched 
out as a bourgeois world with liberal values. Ethnic nationalism grew in the German 
Empire of  1871, but was particularly strong in the Habsburg Empire. Nationalism and 
liberalism went hand in hand at the beginning of  the nineteenth century but were no 
longer synonymous at its end. Indeed, they had become antagonistic. Where national-
ism could reach out to the lower classes, liberalism could not. The German Empire, 
 4 Contrary to Georg Schmidt, Geschichte des Alten Reiches: Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit 1495–1806 
(Munich, 1999), who argues that the Old Reich indeed showed characteristics of a state.
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which liberals had longed for over decades, was decidedly illiberal, albeit based on a 
democratic franchise which, however, favoured socialists and Catholics rather than 
liberals.
The author points out the inherent contradictions of  modern German history 
particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their impact on the 
lifeworlds of  the citizens of  the German states, and the consequent restrictions and 
challenges. One of  the most advanced representations of  political modernity was the 
constitution of  the Weimar Republic in 1919. In Weimar the antagonisms of  mod-
ern German history were played out in the open: political radicalization under the 
auspices of  modern mass culture and mass politics, high modernity in roaring speed 
alongside racial utopias. Astonishingly, the author does not include a couple of  telling 
antagonisms within the liberal bourgeoisie: first, its long tradition of  anti-Semitism, 
and second, its deeply entrenched opposition to parliamentary rule despite its empha-
sis on the ‘rule of  law’.
The Third Reich was just one of  several possible outcomes of  German history. 
‘It resulted from collusion in the NSDAP’s 1933 “seizure of  power” of  conservative 
elites—both aristocratic and bourgeois—that had never reconciled themselves to 
Weimar democracy, and from divisions among National Socialism opponents’ (p. 283). 
In the same way the Holocaust was not the consequence of  modern German history. 
At the end of  his remarkable chapter on Jewish life in Germany the author concludes: 
‘In 1914 the arrival of  anything remotely like severe anti-Semitic violence was unim-
aginable’ (p.  224). To understand the origins of  the murder of  the European Jews 
requires a look at the Second World War and particularly the establishment of  an 
Aryan Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. In addition to the long history of  anti-Semitism 
it was the appeal of  a pure racial community, which, under the stress of  a consciously 
triggered war of  extermination, set in motion a chain of  events that treated defenceless 
and helpless people as atrocious war enemies. For this the Nazis found compliance in 
German society.
The fourth life of  the German nation began 1945 and centred around a democratic 
West Germany. Treating postwar Germany as a fourth life raises the question of  the 
‘Zero Hour’. There has never been a ‘Zero Hour’, for many Nazis and their collabora-
tors held important positions in West German society up until the 1960s, sometimes 
even longer. The refounding of  the German Society according to liberal and demo-
cratic values took decades and a new generation. Hagen is aware of  this problem. The 
reason for the democratic turn of  German society lay in the politics of  the Western 
powers after 1945. It was their influence that overcame the antidemocratic resentments 
in German society.
This textbook raises fundamental questions about the periodization and the coher-
ence of  modern German history: a history that narrates a chain of  events in an 
understandable and causal way relies on interpretation. Interpretations tend to over-
homogenize their historical subjects. How can an author be coherent without being 
teleological? These questions become particularly important when it comes to Nazi 
dictatorship and the Holocaust. The question ‘Who did it?’ looms large over every 
account of  modern German history. How can one live up to the moral questions of  
modern Germany while at the same time letting the sources and actors have their say, 
when they run contrary to our answers?
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In order to give an interpretative account and include dissent, the notion of  develop-
ment, so familiar to German historiography since the heydays of  historical scholarship 
in the nineteenth century, has been prominent. Development spans decades and centu-
ries, it evolves and unfolds, from time to time it realizes itself  or even ‘rises to its height’. 
The notion of  development is close to organic language. How can a historical narra-
tive explain change over time and at the same time avoid reifying organic language? 
Furthermore, the central variable for development has long been structures. Structures 
allow the narration of  continuity and change. Although an analytical concept, struc-
tures tend to get reified and then to act like individuals. Once reified they convey a sense 
of  continuity that cannot be falsified through the sources.
The author avoids the traps of  reifying organic language. Whereas the structur-
alist accounts wrote about nationalism, liberalism and conservatism, we find in this 
book individual liberals, such as Jacob Venedey, and nationalists. Hagen underlines 
his actor-centred approach with many pictures and biographies of  his protagonists. 
But then, what made Venedey or Theodor Mommsen liberals, and Adolf  Stöcker an 
anti-Semite? In most of  these cases the author argues with actions: Venedey was a 
1848 revolutionary and Mommsen resisted Heinrich von Treitschke in 1879, Stöcker 
launched the anti-Semitic Christian social movement. Although he thereby adheres to 
his methodology, this causal circle is unsatisfactory.
Continuity belonged to the methodological toolbox of  national historiography, since 
it implies notions of  overarching identity through time. And this was particularly inter-
esting for national historiography. When that tradition lost its attraction, historians 
began to replace concepts of  national continuity. That has been done quite exten-
sively in cultural history and in the cultural history of  nationalism.5 Concepts such as 
‘invention of  tradition’ by Eric Hobsbawm and ‘imagined communities’ by Benedict 
Anderson were instrumental in deconstructing national continuities.
The deconstruction of  national continuities has, however, not been the end of  the 
story. Even when historians argue for constant change, this is theoretically only possible 
if  change is measured against the backdrop of  continuity. ‘That something is undergo-
ing change can only be understood relative to that which does not change’. If  every-
thing changes, change cannot be measured. Change is a discontinuity within a context 
of  the non-changing. It is never total or complete disruption. It requires something 
related to the entity undergoing change that does not change. In this sense continuities 
make change possible. Continuity and change imply each other. They share a ‘mutu-
ally constituted nature’.6 Colin Wight warns us to be wary of  grand claims that there is 
change everywhere and at any time, since there are always elements of  continuity within 
change. Also, change is not simply related to actors deciding for change. ‘Agents bring 
about change, but not in circumstances of  their own choosing; the sources of  change 
can reside in the agential or structural conditions’. We have not really understood the 
 5 Cf. Siegfried Weichlein, ‚Nationalismus und Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa: Ein Forschungsüberblick’, 
Neue Politische Literatur, 51 (2006), pp. 265–351.
 6 Cf. Colin Wight, ‘The Continuity of Change, or a Change in Continuity?’, International Studies Review, 3 (2001), 
pp. 81–9, here p. 82.
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relationship between change and continuity in theoretical terms. So far change has 
been aligned with sharp breaks, ruptures or revolutions. But there are other and slower 
modes of  change. Change itself  can be continuous. This change can be a mode of  con-
tinuity, and so the question arises as to whether there are different modes of  continuity 
or, conversely, whether continuities can change.
In the book we get a picture of  many contradictions constantly resurfacing and cre-
ating antagonisms within politics and culture. This might have been a good path to 
pursue, but we are never given any form of  comprehensive or synthetic accounts of  the 
grammar of  conflicts: political conflicts, economic conflicts, cultural conflicts, religious 
conflicts, ethnic conflicts. The challenge for historians who abandon any kind of  master 
narrative—and rightly so!—is at least to come up with some kind of  conflict theory, if  
only implicit. What kind of  conflicts are embedded in the matter that is about to be 
narrated? Which conflicts are conflicts of  a higher level, or meta-conflicts, so to speak, 
producing other conflicts? What kind of  conflicts are more important: those about race 
or those about class, those about culture or those about party alliance?
The economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron has tried to theorize and concep-
tualize continuity and change. He distinguished between five different forms of  con-
tinuities: constancy of  direction, periodicity of  events, endogenous change, length of  
causal regress and stability of  the rate of  change.7 Each of  these forms provide a matrix 
for the study of  continuity. They are interlocked and cannot be neatly separated. For 
instance the constancy of  direction refers to the origins of  processes of  growth and 
expansion. It allows for change within the same direction, for speeding up and slow-
ing down. Only the direction accounts for continuity, not the speed or the identical 
direction. Seen from this perspective, even setbacks can be integrated within continuity. 
Continuity as constancy of  direction is different from continuity conceived as periodic-
ity. When periodicities are interrupted this may not affect the constancy of  direction. 
‘What makes continuity at periodic density a worthwhile tool of  historical analysis is 
manageable length of  the periods and also the fact that periodicity requires abstrac-
tion and generalization: a certain complex of  phenomena must be paired out from the 
mass of  kindred historical tissue’.8 The historical circle from democracy, aristocracy 
and monarchy depends on change. Change can have the form of  continuity, if  one 
accepts the Aristotelian view of  the political circles. Changes from tyranny to aristoc-
racy or from oligarchy to democracy, are then part of  that continuity. Even revolutions 
and panics can be part of  that continuity, if  they are seen as mechanisms for recurrence. 
Continuity can be conceptualized by repetition. In sum, Gerschenkron argues for the 
compatibility of  continuity and change through flexible criteria of  continuity.
Peter Burke moves in the same direction.9 He quotes Fernand Braudel, the historian 
of  the longue durée and the Mediterranean, who was critical of  the history of  events, the 
histoire evénémentielle. For Braudel these events were merely ‘surface disturbances’, ‘crests 
of  foam that the tides of  history carry on their strong backs’. He and his followers in 
 7 Alexander Gerschenkron, ‘On the Concept of Continuity in History’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, 106 (1962), pp. 195–209.
 8 Gerschenkron, ‘On the Concept of Continuity in History’, p. 202.
 9 Peter Burke, ‘Introduction: Concepts of Continuity and Change in History’, in Burke (ed.), The New Cambridge 
Modern History, vol. 13: Companion Volume (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1–14.
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the Annales School favoured concepts of  continuity that were flexible enough to incor-
porate changes at the level of  the history of  events. What the history of  mentalities 
was for Braudel, rationalization was for Max Weber. Marxists of  different kind held 
steadfast to a conception of  history according to which change was instrumental for 
continuity—the continuity of  class warfare. Contrary to Marxism and Max Weber, the 
French Annales School did not privilege overarching concepts of  continuity spanning 
centuries or even world history. Whereas revolutions were of  quintessential importance 
for Marxism as well as for modernization theory, Braudel’s interest lay more in past 
continuities: why did the French old regime persist for so long?
For other historians—including the adherents of  modernization theory—the con-
cept of  tradition played a major role in analysing past continuities of  old regimes. 
Tradition turned from an argument in the sources into an analytical concept. It had 
been a self-explanatory concept. Historians began to understand that tradition involved 
a complicated and multi-level set of  practices. Tradition meant enormous labour, coor-
dinated practices and an in-depth understanding of  the social, cultural and economic 
implications of  continuity.
William W. Hagen also observes continuities, but he sees them in a different way. He 
places them mostly beyond German borders. When he praises the Weimar constitu-
tion of  August 1919 as the most modern constitution, he does this comparatively with 
regard to the French or American constitutions. After 1945, when describing postwar 
democracy, he puts the influence of  the Western occupation powers centre stage. In the 
same vein, he underlines the influence of  the reformist Soviet Union under Gorbachev 
and the other protest movements in Eastern Europe for the downfall of  the Berlin 
Wall in 1989. The continuities in this book are in fact similarities between standards of  
political life in West and East Germany respectively. It was not tradition, nor the grow-
ing force of  a democratic party, nor the protesters of  1989 that moved German society 
into a democratic era, but rather the changing constraints of  Germany’s neighbours 
in the West as well as in the East. The author is right to distance himself  from any sort 
of  master narrative. But you cannot escape the thorny questions of  self-perpetuating 
inequalities within German society.
William Hagen identifies four historical life worlds. How did they learn from each 
other? How did they position themselves in relationship to their predecessors? Where 
are processes of  learning and forgetting, of  adaptation and rejection? How did the 
second German life after the French Revolution learn from the first German life before 
1789? Asking for learning processes does not imply that learning in an absolute sense 
indeed took place. But it takes seriously the inherent claim of  the historical actors, not 
to act as if  they were the first, but to continue, defend, rebuild and expand on what they 
experienced as their past.
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